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The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been employed against
the government in numerous contexts. In Schweiker v. Hansen,
the Supreme Court severely limited the use of the doctrine against
governmental agencies. This article develops estoppel in immigrationpractice prior to Miranda v. INS, then focuses on two recent courts of appeals decisions which successfully distinguish
Hansen. The author demonstratesthat estoppel remains a viable
tool against the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and
outlines strategic considerations in bringing an estoppel action
on behalf of an alien.
For the immigration practitioner, the concept of equitable estoppel as a viable claim or deportation defense has at best been

murky. The immigration bar was left with little guidance or hope
for estoppel as a practicable claim after the Supreme Court rejected a rather sympathetic case and announced that the government would have to be guilty of "aIfifative misconduct" in order

for estoppel to be seriously considered in the immigration context.' With the exception of certain situations in which the government had exacerbated its mistake by violating its own
* For a final disposition of INS v. Miranda, 51 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Nov. 8,
1982) (per curiam), see infra ADDENDUM.
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1. See INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (Supreme Court declined to find estoppel
against the Immigration and Naturalization Service, suggesting that there was no
December 1982

Vol. 20

No. 1

regulations, 2 and other more narrow circumstances, 3 most courts
had declined to find "affirmative misconduct" by the government
4
even in some extremely inequitable situations.
However, two recent cases have provided practitioners with
new optimism for the estoppel theory. By ruling in favor of the
aliens involved in Akbarin v. Immigration & NaturalizationServ6
ice,5 and Miranda v. Immigration & NaturalizationService, two
federal courts of appeals have provided new guidance for establishing "affirmative misconduct" by the government. This article
examines the effect of these two cases on estoppel as a concept to
be applied in immigration proceedings. Part I provides a background of estoppel in the immigration context and discusses the
previous case law; parts H and I discuss each of the cases; part
IV analyzes these cases in the context of and contrasts them with
prior case law; and part V discusses both the practical effects of
these cases on estoppel claims and the formulation of strategy for
practitioners.
BACKGROUND

The concept of applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel
against the government in deportation proceedings has no statutory basis. The Supreme Court expressed reservations very early
7
about applying estoppel against the government in general.
However, by relying heavily on considerations of "elementary
fairness" which previously had moved the Supreme Court in
other contexts,8 lower courts found situations where the governaffirmative misconduct). For a further discussion of this case, see infra notes 10-18
and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Sun n Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976) (Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) failed to follow regulation and grant petitioner labor
certification and preference for which he was plainly qualified). See infra notes
49.50, 53-57 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case. CornellRodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976) (failure to warn alien, as required by
22 C.F.R. § 42.122(d), that marriage before entry would invalidate visa). For a further discussion, 6f this case, see infra notes 32-51 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Galvez v. Howerton, 503 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (INS breach
of own Op4rations Instructions and duty to fill yearly quotas). For a further discussion of this case, see infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
4. See Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 971 (1976) (aliens misled into thinking entry legal; later deported because
failed to meet their visa requirements); see also Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d
204 (2d Cir. 1980) (naturalization denied to Filipino war veteran who was not informed of his right to apply for United States citizenship).
5. 669 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1982).
6. 673 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
7. See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 CoLrmi L. REV. 551 (1979).
8. See, e.g., Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951) (denial of citizenship
barred because the State Department misled the alien).
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ment should be estopped. 9

INS v. HIBi
In the immigration context, however, the Supreme Court jolted
immigration practitioners with its 1973 ruling in INS v. Hibi.o
Hibi was a Filipino who had served in the Philippine Scouts, a
unit of the United States Army during World War II. He was honorably discharged in 1945.11 Upon traveling to the United States

in 1964, Hibi learned for the first time that under the Nationality
Act of 1940, he could have applied for United States citizenship as
a veteran, but that the deadline for filing had been established as
December 31, 1946.12 The law had also provided that officers be

appointed to handle the naturalization procedures for non-citizens still serving in the armed forces and thus outside the jurisdiction of a naturalization court. However, while naturalization
officers were sent to countries such as England, Iceland, and

North Africa during World War II, none were sent to the Philip-

pines.13 Hibi thus argued that the government was estopped from
relying on the 1946 deadline for its "failure to advise him, during
the time he was eligible, of his right to apply for naturalization,
and from the [Immigration and Naturalization Service's] failure
to provide a naturalization representative in the Philippines during all of the time Hibi and those in his class were eligible for
naturalization."14
The Supreme Court rejected Hibi's argument and concluded:
While the issue of whether "affirmative misconduct" on the part of the
Government might estop it from denying citizenship was left open in Montana v. Kennedy, no conduct of the sort there adverted to was involved
9. See, e.g., United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973) (government action for money barred where parties had relied on government's approval of contracts); United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970)
(government prevented from conveying land after company had expended large
sums of money); Brandt v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970) (estoppel may be asserted especially when the government acts in a proprietary capacity); Tejeda v.
INS, 346 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1965) (unjust to deport alien who had relied upon misstatement of government official regarding authority to reenter); Schuster v. C.LR.,
312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.. 1962). See generally Bacon, Estopping INS-"Affirmative
Misconduct" Makes Positively Bad Law, IMmG. J., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 8.
10. 414 U.S. 5 (1973).
11. Id. at 5-6.
12. Act of December 28, 1945, ch. 590, 59 Stat. 658 (amending Nationality Act of
1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137) (repealed 1952).
13. 414 U.S. at 10 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 7-8.

here. We do not think that the failure to fully publicize the rights which
Congress accorded under the Act of 1940, or the failure to have stationed
in the Philippine Islands during all of the time those rights were available
an authorized naturalization representative, can give rise to an estoppel
against the Government. 15

These remarks have prompted lower courts to conclude that in order for an estoppel claim to be successful in the immigration context, "affirmative misconduct" by the government must be
proven.16 But while the possibility of estoppel against the government in the immigration context remained open, the Supreme
Court provided lower courts with no standards or guidelines for
defining "affirmative misconduct."17 Judicial results were often
mixed and, at times, distressing. 18
SANTIAGO V.

INS and the Ninth Circuit

Prior to Hibi, the Ninth Circuit had been the forerunner in developing the concept of estoppel in immigration cases.19 In Santiago v. INS,20 however, the Ninth Circuit felt obligated to retreat
from this development in light of Hibi despite some rather compelling facts.2 1
Santiago involved four separate petitioners who had been
granted immigrant visas under section 203(a) (8) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,22 as the husband or child of a person entitled to immigration.23 Each petitioner, or derivative beneficiary
as they are commonly called, was subject to the "accompanying
or following to join his spouse or parent" requirement of section
15. Id. at 8-9 (citation omitted).
16. See, e.g., Corneil-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976); Santiago v.
INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
17. See generally Note, Estopping the Government in Immigration Cases: The
ImmigrationEstoppel Light Remains CautionaryYellow, 56 NoTRE DAME LAw. 731
(1981); Asimow, EstoppelAgainst the Government The Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1 IMm. &NATnONALiTY L. REV. 161 (1976-77); Article, Estoppel and
Immigration, 22 CATH. LAw. 287 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Sun U Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976); Corneil-Rodriguez
v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976); Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975) (en
banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); Old v. INS, 598 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1979) (per

curiam).

19. See Bacon, supra note 9, at 25. Bacon suggests that courts abandon the
"affirmative misconduct" language and return to the Ninth Circuit's pre-Hibi formulation of. (1) determining whether all the elements of equitable estoppel are
met; and (2) weighing the potential hardship to the parties seeking estoppel
against the potential harm to the public interest if estoppel is-granted. Id.
20. 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975).
21. See Note, Santiago v. Immigration and NaturalizationService--The Ninth
CircuitRetreatsfrom its Modern Approach to Estoppel Against the Government,
1976 UTAH L. REv. 371.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (8) (Supp. IV 1980) (formerly section 203(a) (9) of the
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (9)).
23. Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d at 489.
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203(a) (8) of the Act 24 at the time of entering the United States.
Therefore the petitioners should not have been allowed to enter
the United States unless the primary immigrant spouse or parent
was with them, or had already entered. Although for various reasons none of the spouses or parents of the petitioners ever immigrated, thereby making it technically impossible to meet the
"accompanying or following to join" requirement, 2 5 every petitioner was admitted for entry by immigration officers. This was in
spite of the fact that it was evident on the face of each visa that
the holder was entering based on a derivative beneficiary basis.26
In fact, one petitioner was admitted even after being questioned
with
by an immigration officer and found to be in noncompliance
27
the "accompanying or following to join" requirement.
At their deportation hearings, the petitioners were found deportable due to their excludability at entry because of their failure to meet the cited visa requirement. On appeal, the petitioners
argued that the government should be estopped from asserting
their excludability at entry because they were "unfairly misled"
28
into the belief that their entry was lawful.
In adopting the "affirmative misconduct" standards of Hibi in
immigration estoppel cases, the Ninth Circuit denied the petitioners' claim. Without defining or establishing guidelines for determining what "affirmative misconduct" is, the court simply
concluded that the failures of INS officials here were "less blameworthy" than those in Hibi.29
Thus emerged the comparative test of whether government failures are "more blameworthy" than those in Hibi. There are two
problems with this test. First, determining whether there has
been "affirmative misconduct" made it difficult to grant estoppel
claims, given the relatively sympathetic facts in Hibi and Santiago where no "affirmative misconduct" was found. This was apparent from the rulings in certain cases decided subsequent to
Santiago within the Ninth Circuit.3 0 Second, while the "compari24. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (8) (Supp. IV 1980).
25. 526 F.2d at 489.
26. Id. at 490.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 491.
29. Id. at 493.
30. See, e.g., Old v. INS, 598 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (student's
claim that failure to notify him that permission was needed to work excused his
violation of student status was denied); Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veter-

son with Hibi" test appears flexible given the variables in different immigration cases, the test could be viewed by some courts as
license to do as they please. 3 '
CORNEzL-RODRIGUEZ v. INS, FundamentalFairness,and Violation

of Regulations
The Hibi decision did not prove to be much of an obstacle to
the Second Circuit, however, when it addressed an estoppel claim
in Corneil-Rodriguezv. INS.32 In that case the petitioner had received an immigrant visa as the unmarried child of a United
States resident. However, the American consul who had issued
the visa failed to warn her-as mandated by section 42.122(d) of
title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations-that her visa would
automatically become invalid if she married before entering the
United States. 33 Sometime after her visa interview and three
days before entering the United States, the petitioner married her
childhood sweetheart, ignorant of the fact that this action would
technically invalidate her visa.34 The INS sought to deport the peSecond Circuit considered the issue of
titioner, and on appeal the
35
"affirmative misconduct."
Well aware of the Supreme Court's failure in Hibi to provide a
definition or test for "affirmative misconduct," the Second Circuit
found "affirmative misconduct" by comparing the government's
mistake in this case with those in other favorable courts of appeals decisions which had not been disturbed by the Hibi decision.36 The court stated that the "equities must always be
ans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (in light of Santiago, the court revised its
opinion to rely on non-estoppel grounds).
31. See infra notes 113-157 and accompanying text.
32. Cornell-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976).
33. Id. at 302-03.
34. Id. at 304.
35. Id. at 302.
36. Id. at 306-07. The court compared its facts with those in Podea v. Acheson,
179 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1950) and Lee You Fee v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1956),
rev'd on other grounds, 355 U.S. 61 (1957), and concluded that the failure to warn
as mandated by section 42.122(d) was as misleading and severe as in those cases.
532 F.2d at 306-07. In Podea the Second Circuit had reversed a lower court deternuination that the petitioner had lost his citizenship by serving in a foreign army
and swearing allegiance to a foreign potentate. Although the law technically
called for forfeiture of United States citizenship for this action, the petitioner had
joined the Roumanian Army only after an erroneous State Department ruling that
he had already lost his United States citizenship and had become a Roumanian
national because of certain prior acts. Lee You Fee involved a statutory provision
by which children born abroad to a United States citizen parent would forfeit
United States citizenship unless they took up United States residence by their sixteenth birthday. Denial of citizenship was deemed improper by the Seventh Circuit where the child had made timely application but was prevented from entering
the United States within the prescribed period by the "tardiness and unnecessary
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carefully weighed in the context of the particular facts," 37 and
concluded that the failure to provide the warning mandated by
section 42.122(d) amounted to "affirmative misconduct." 38 The
Second Circuit's comparative type of analysis bears striking resemblance to that in Santiago, and the divergent result can be
viewed as an example of how in practice the "affirmative misconduct" standard could actually provide flexibility in approach. 39
Two other aspects of the Corneil-Rodriguez case are of extreme
importance. First, a careful reading of the case reveals that the
Second Circuit in many respects downplayed the affirmative misconduct estoppel issue in the case in favor of "basic notions of
fairness" and prevention of "manifest injustice."40 In striving for
a "sensible and humane application of the law,"4 1 the court relied
heavily on a prior Supreme Court case, Moser v. United States.42
There, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach the estoppel issue in barring the United States from denying citizenship
to an alien who had been misled by the State Department. Instead, the Supreme Court felt that a ruling in the alien's favor
was "required by elementary fairness." 4 3 The most liberal reading of Corneil-Rodriguez in light of the reliance on Moser would
suggest that, given the right equities, an alien could prevail on a
fundamental fairness issue alone. At minimum it is certainly safe
to conclude that where an opposite result would be unjust, extremely sympathetic circumstances could tip the scales in favor of
an estoppel claim.44
Additionally, the petitioner's position in Corneil-Rodriguez was
given great support by the fact that the government had violated
its own regulation. 45 The regulation had been promulgated to prodelay by officials of the consular office in issuing" the necessary travel orders. 236
F.2d at 887.
37. 532 F.2d at 306.
38. Id. at 306-07.
39. See infra notes 113-157 and accompanying text.
40. 532 F.2d at 302, 307.
41. Id. at 305.
42. 341 U.S. 41 (1951).
43. Id. at 47.
44. Similar use of a "traditional standards of fairness" theory can be found in
Attoh v. INS, 606 F.2d 1273, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (due process denied where alien
was not informed of nature of charges and right to counsel). But see Dong Sik
Kwon v. INS, 646 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1981) (request for retroactive priority date denied in spite of INS mistake in accepting permanent residence application).
45. 532 F.2d at 304.

tect "minor aliens of marriageable age who might inadvertently
forfeit their eligibility to enter our country in ignorance of this
statute." 46 Thus with respect to such mandatory regulations, the
court felt "certain that Congress would not have wished the government's flouting of these regulations to occasion the banishment of a hopeless alien from our shores."47 The use of the
government's violation of its own regulations to bolster estoppel
claims has since occurred in other cases. Sun Ii Yoo v. INS,49
for example, involved excessive delay in the adjudication of a
sixth preference visa petition. The Ninth Circuit found "affirmative misconduct" on the part of INS but in doing so stressed the
fact that the petitioner was plainly qualified for a labor certification and preference status under a regulation then in force and
that INS's failure to follow the regulation prevented him from acquiring preference status in time to qualify for permanent
residence. 50
In demonstrating the possible flexibility of the "affirmative misconduct" standard, the Corneil-Rodriguez decision also illuminated the use of fundamental fairness and violation of regulations
not only as supporting equities for estoppel, but as independent
bases for relief.51
46. Id. at 303.
47. Id. at 306.
48. See generally Hing, When INS Breaks the Rules, Courts Will Listen, IMv uG.
J., Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 8. See also Galvez v. Howerton, 503 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. CaL
1980) in which the INS's violation of its Operations Instructions contributed to the
district court's finding of affirmative misconduct. Operations Instructions in general are not the same as regulations, but are given tremendous weight where a
benefit is intended to be conferred by the particular instruction. See Nicholas v.
INS, 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979) (Operations Instructions relating to deferred
action); David v. INS, 548 F.2d 219, 223 (9th Cir. 1977) (Operations Instructions relating to deferred action).
49. 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976).
50. Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975), was distinguished on the
grounds that Yoo had an absolute right under INS's regulations while Santiago did
not. 534 F.2d at 1329. The Ninth Circuit continued its comparative analysis approach in Sun II Yoo by comparing its facts with those in Santiago and Hibi. 534
F.2d at 1328.
51. Cornell-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d at 302, 307. It has been acknowledged
that where a regulation serves a purpose of benefit to the defendant and the government's violation of that regulation prejudiced the alien's interest, appropriate
relief for the alien should be granted if properly raised. See Tejeda-Mata v. INS,
626 F.2d 721, 725-26 (9th Cir. 1980) (violation of regulations must be raised in timely
fashion); Matter of Garcia-Flores, LD. No. 2780 (1980) (prejudice shown where INS
failed to advise alien of right to counsel); cf. United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591
F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979) (failure to advise alien of right to consult with foreign consulate insufficient without a showing of specific harm). See generally Hing, supra
note 48; Helbush, INS Violations of its Own Regulations: Relieffor the Alien, 12
GOLDEN GATE U.L. RE V. 217 (1982).
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Cases Involving Delay
The INS has always been notorious for its lengthy delays in
processing petitions and applications. For a variety of reasons
(such as increased workload, staff reduction, or intentional misconduct), the issue of excessive delay has been raised52 many
times as a basis for establishing "affirmative misconduct."
In Sun Ii Yoo v. INS,53 for example, the INS failed to explain a
one-year delay in responding to the petitioner.5 4 During that time
the labor certification requirements were changed for the category under which the petitioner was applying and he could not
meet the new requirements.5 5 Petitioner argued that he should
be eligible for relief under the previous requirements because,
but for the INS's unjustified delay, he would have obtained a labor certification.5 6 In finding "affirmative misconduct" and estopping the government from imposing the new requirements, the
Ninth Circuit found "no apparent justification for the Service's
unreasonable delay in recognizing the bona fides of Yoo's petition. Such conduct... fully merits the characterization of
'oppressive.' ,,57

In Villena v. INS58 the Ninth Circuit continued its assault on
excessive INS delays.5 9 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
had been critical of this petitioner for making no attempt to qualify as an immigrant. 60 In fact, however, Villena had petitioned for
an occupational preference classification and the INS, without ap52. In Galvez v. Howerton, the backlogs due to workloads were considered by

the court. 503 F. Supp. at 39.
53. 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976); see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
54. 534 F.2d at 1328.
55. Under the new requirements, Yoo could not obtain a labor certification as
a machinist without a job offer. He was unable to do so because the petitioning
company was no longer in existence when the requirements changed. Id. at 1325.
56. Id. at 1328.
57. Id. The court distinguished Guinto v. INS, 446 F.2d 11 (9th Cir. 1971),
where a delay of a few months in determining an alien's eligibility for third preference visa status was occasioned by the government's "understandable need" to
obtain extensions of time in order to decide whether to proceed with an appeal.
534 F.2d at 1328.
58. 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
59. The primary issue in Villena was suspension of deportation. Much of the
liberal language in the case relating to motions to reopen for suspension purposes
has been clouded because the Supreme Court reversed a companion case dealing
with such motions to reopen. INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981). However, the language in Villena dealing with estoppel should remain precedential.
60. 622 F.2d at 1360.

parent justification, delayed responding to the petition for almost
four years. The Ninth Circuit therefore held the INS was estopped from claiming that the petitioner failed to adequately pur6
sue his claim for preference classification. 1
Relying on Villena and Sun I Yoo, a federal district court in
Galvez v. Howerton62 concluded that INS officials had engaged in
"affirmnative misconduct" where they improperly rejected plaintiffs' applications for adjustment of status coupled with an unreasonable delay in processing the applications.6 3 The plaintiffs
argued that had their fifth preference petitions been processed
properly and within a reasonable time, they would have gained
the benefits of an earlier priority date and been eligible for permanent resident status during a fiscal year in which there were
sufficient fifth preference visas alloted to their native country.64
Aided by what was considered the breach of INS's own operations standards and the government's "statutory duty to fulfill
yearly quotas," the district court found that where a delay by INS
is unreasonable and unjustified it constitutes "affirmative
65
misconduct."
While the particular facts of delay did not fare as well in the
Seventh Circuit case of Mendoza-Hernandez v. INS,66 the court
left open the possibility of estoppel in excessive delay situations.
In Mendoza-Hernandez there were two long delays. The first was
a two-and-one-half year investigation of the petitioner's marital
status ordered by an immigration judge. 67 The second was another investigation ordered by the immigration judge that took
another two-and-one-half years following the petitioner's submission of a suspension of deportation application. 68 The petitioner
argued that the INS should be estopped from deporting him because of these delays.6 9 While the Seventh Circuit recognized
that "unexplained delays by the Service in its administrative pro61. Id. at 1361.
62. 503 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1980).

63. Id. at 36.
64. Id. at 37-38.
65. Id. at 39; see also Kumi v. Civiletti, Civ. No. 80-0580-A (E.D. Va. Oct. 24,
1980) (four-and-one-half year delay) (as reported in 58 INTERPRETER RELEASES 130

(1981)).

66. 664 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1981).
67. Id. at 637.

68. Id. The ordering of a character investigation following the submission of a
suspension of deportation application is routine. In fact, a character investigation
is required under IvmGRATION AND NATURAIZATION

SERVICE, UNrrED STATES
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

§ 242.7(b) (2) (1981). Character investigations vary in time from approximately six
months to two years. The normal time span is nine to twelve months.
69. 664 F.2d at 639.
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cedures can amount to affirmative misconduct," the court stated

there must be a showing of actual "prejudice" to the alien in order to estop the government.7 0 Since the petitioner made no
showing that he had been prejudiced by the delays, the court
found no basis for imposing estoppel. 71 But the Seventh Circuit

appeared willing to grant estoppel where prejudice from delay
72
can be proved.

The BIA Stance
The BIA has never exhibited much receptivity for the government estoppel theory.73 The BIA's most recent opinion is reflected in Matter of M/V "Solemn Judge."74 The case involved
large fines imposed on the owner of a carrier who violated section
273(a) of the Act,7 5 by transporting Cuban refugees without visas
into the United States during the spring of 1980.76 The carrier argued that the government should be estopped from imposing the
fines for several reasons. The carrier contended that he was encouraged to go to Cuba after former President Carter determined
that persons who had taken sanctuary in the Peruvian embassy in
Havana could be considered refugees, and because of this unforeseen emergency 77 up to 3500 refugees could be admitted into the
70. Id.
71. Id. Requiring a showing of "actual prejudice," while not explicitly stated,
is certainly consistent with Ninth Circuit opinions dealing with excessive INS delays. For example, in Shon Ning Lee v. INS, 576 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1978), a ninemonth "delay" by the INS in processing an application while the BIA was making
another decision was found not to constitute affirmative misconduct because there
was no "causal connection" between the delay and the alien's failure to reapply
while visas were still available. 576 F.2d at 1382. And certainly in Sun II Yoo v.
INS, 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976), the fact that the alien was actually prejudiced by
INS's delay was extremely important. Id. at 1329; see also Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d
at 1361.
72. Mendoza-Hernandez v. INS, 664 F.2d at 639. The road to "affirmative misconduct" paved by excessive INS delays appeared to run into a major roadblock,
however, when the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Miranda v. INS, 638
F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 101 U.S. 1468 (1981), reaffirmed 673
F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982), in light of Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (per
curiam). But the Ninth Circuit stood firm on its position that such unjustified INS
delays could amount to "affirmative misconduct." See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Matter of Onal, I.D. No. 2886 (1981) (delay in holding rescission
hearings not shown to be unreasonable or prejudicial).
74. LD. No. 2894 (1982).
75. Immigration and Nationality Act § 273(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1976).
76. IM. No. 2894, at 3 (1982).
77. Id. at 4-5.

United States due to grave humanitarian concerns. Furthermore
the carrier felt that he acted pursuant to the President's "open
hearts and open arms" policy.7 8 Finally the carrier alleged that
prior to departure, he went to a United States Customs Service office, advised officials of the nature of his voyage, and received a
travel clearance without having been warned that he was subject
79
to a fine for transporting refugees.
The BIA found that there was no encouragement of the carrier
to travel, and that there was no duty to warn him that he would
be subject to fines. 80 It concluded that no "affirmative misconduct" had been established and denied the estoppel claim.
However, even if "affirmative misconduct" had been found by
the BIA, language in its opinion indicates that it might not have
granted estoppel at any rate. The BIA questioned whether it even
had "the authority to apply [the estoppel] doctrine."8 1 Furthermore, the BIA's reading of Schweiker v. Hansen8 2 was that "the
Supreme Court has not yet decided whether even 'affirmative
misconduct' is sufficient to estop the government." 83 Thus the
BIA certainly does not appear ready or willing to make new inroads in the estoppel area.
SCHWEIKER v. HANSEN

Prior to the Akbarin and Miranda decisions, the Supreme
Court decided Schweiker v. Hansen,84 denying a claim of estoppel
against the government in the social security area. In Hansen the
claimant met with a Social Security Administration representative who erroneously informed her that she was not eligible for
benefits. 85 The representative also failed to recommend to the
claimant, as was required of him under instructions in the internal department manual, that if she were uncertain about her eligi78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
450 U.S. 785 (1981) (per curiam).

83. LD. No. 2894, at 5. Prior to the Hansen case the Fifth Circuit had similarly

reasoned that the "Supreme Court has left unanswered the question whether, in
some circumstances, the government may be estopped from denying citizenship to

an applicant by the affirmative misconduct of the government or its employees."
Dong Sik Kwon v. INS, 646 F.2d 909, 916 (5th Cir. 1981). Whether the Fifth Circuit
would grant estoppel given the right circumstances was not answered in that case
because there the alien's counsel acknowledged that there was no "affirmative
misconduct" and that the facts did not give rise to estoppel Id.
84. 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (per curiam). In fact, Miranda had originally been vacated and remanded in light of the Hansen decision. See INS v. Miranda, 101 U.S.
1468 (1981).

85. 450 U.S. at 786.
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bility she should file a written application. 86 Had she filed at that
time, the claimant would have been eligible for twelve months of
retroactive benefits from the date of the conversation. She did
not actually fie until approximately a year later when she learned
87
the truth.
In rejecting the claimant's contention that the government
should be estopped from determining her eligibility for benefits
only as of the actual date of written application, the Supreme
Court first concluded that there was no "affirmative misconduct."88 The Court felt that at worst, the representative's conduct
did not cause the claimant to take action or fail to take action that
she "could not correct at any time." 89 Additionally, since the internal department manual contained no binding regulations, the
errors of the representative were considered "far short" of noncompliance with a valid regulation which would raise a serious
question of estoppel.O
Hansen made a point, emphasized in both Akbarin and Miranda, of protecting the public treasury. The Court noted that
the judiciary has a duty to "observe the conditions defined by
Congress for charging the public treasury."9 1 In discussing the
lower court cases cited in Justice Marshall's dissent where estoppel had been granted, the majority in Hansen distinguished several of the cases where "estoppel did not threaten the public fisc
as estoppel does here." 92 This language was persuasively used by
the Akbarin and Miranda courts to distinguish Hansen from im93
migration cases where the public fisc is generally not involved.
THE AKBARIN CASE

In Akbarin v. Immigration & NaturalizationService,94 the primary alien had entered the United States as a nonimmigrant student as defined in section 101(a) (15) (F) (i) of the Act.9 5 Akbarin
86. Id.
87. Id. at 786-87.
88. Id. at 789.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 789-90.
91. Id. at 788 (citing Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947)).
92. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. at 788 n.4.
93. Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d 839, 843 (1st Cir. 1982); Miranda v. INS, 673 F.2d
1105, 1106 (9th Cir. 1982).
94. 669 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1982).

95. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (F) (i) (1976), as amended by Immigration and Na-

was required to meet many conditions in order to maintain his
student status, including one which prohibited him from engaging
in off-campus employment unless he submitted an application for
permission to work, form 1-538, to a school official and then to INS
officials. 96 Without filing form 1-538, Akbarin worked as a busboy
for three weeks at a hotel. Upon learning of this situation, INS officials issued an order to show cause against Akbarin for failing to
maintain his nonimmigrant status by accepting "unauthorized
and becoming deportable under secemployment" at the hotel,
97
tion 241(a) (9) of the Act.
At his hearing, Akbarin attempted to introduce evidence explaining his failure to file form 1-538 and to raise an estoppel defense; however, the immigration judge ruled all such evidence
irrelevant. 98 The evidence which Akbarin had unsuccessfully
sought to introduce consisted of his own testimony and that of the
hotel's personnel director. It seems that when Akbarin went to
the hotel to inquire about employment, he informed the personnel director that he, Akbarin, was an Iranian student. The personnel director then telephoned the INS, and an unidentified official
told the personnel director that Akbarin could work up to twenty
tionality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L No. 97-116, 95 Stat. 1611, 1611. Akbarin's
wife entered the United States as the spouse of a nonimmigrant student as defined in section 101(a) (15) (F) (ii) of the Act. Id. § 1101(a) (15) (F) (ii). Therefore
her status and claim depended on those of her husband. See 669 F.2d at 840.
96. The requirements governing Akbarin's employment are as follows:
A nonimmigrant who has a classification under section 101(a) (15) (F) (i) of
the Act is not permitted to engage in off-campus employment in the
United States, either for an employer or independently, unless all of the
following conditions are met: (i) The student is in good standing as a student who is carrying a full course of studies . .. ; (ii) the student has

demonstrated economic necessity due to unforeseen circumstances arising subsequent to entry or subsequent to change to student classification;
(iii)
the student has demonstrated that acceptance of employment will
not interfere with his/her carrying a full course of study; (iv) the student
has agreed that employment while school is in session will not exceed 20
hours per week, and (v) the student has submitted to an authorized official of a school approved by the Attorney General a form 1-538, and this
form has been certified by that official that all the aforementioned requirements have been met. The authorized official of the school will submit the
certified form 1-538 containing his recommendation together with the student's form 1-94 to the Service office which has jurisdiction over the place
where the school is located. The student has permission to accept employment when he/she receives the form 1-94 endorsed by the Service to
that effect.
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f) (6) (1982).
97. Section 241(a) (9), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (9) (1976), provides in pertinent partAny alien in the United States... shall, upon the order of the Attorney
General, be deported who... (9) was admitted as a nonimmigrant and
failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in which he was admitted or to
which it was changed pursuant to section 1258 of this title, or to comply
with the conditions of any such status....
98. Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 841.
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hours per week. The conversation was related to Akbarin and a
busboy position for twenty hours per week was offered and accepted. 99 INS authorities instituted deportation proceedings
against Akbarin after receiving a letter from the hotel personnel
director informing them of Akbarin's employment. Akbarin was
found deportable and granted voluntary departure.100
The BIA rejected Akbarin's estoppel argument on the grounds
that there was no "affirmative misconduct" by INS and because
Akbarin knew that he had to file form 1-538 in order to obtain eMployment authorization.' 0 ' The First Circuit disagreed and concluded that the facts alleged by Akbarin, if true, might estop the
government from asserting failure to comply with section
214.2(f) (6) of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Akbarin's
petition for review was granted and the case was remandet for
02
new hearing.1
In reaching its decision, the First Circuit necessarily had to address the Supreme Court's unfavorable estoppel decision in
Schweiker v. Hansen. 0 3 But the court of appeals distinguished
that case rather summarily.
Hansen itself is not otherwise helpful here because the decision seems to
rest to some degree on the fact that the estoppel threaten[ed] the public
fisc .... The immigration question in this case does not. In addition, the

of a
alleged error by the INS in the instant case was a misinterpretation
104
binding federal regulation, not a nonbinding one as in Hansen.

The court then discussed the development of "affirmative misconduct" in other cases such as Santiago and Corneil-Rodriguez,lO5 and proceeded to set forth a method for analyzing
06
estoppel claims in immigration cases.
The court felt that two principal inquiries are necessary in any
estoppel claim: "[1] whether the government's action was error,
and [2] if the complaining party reacted to the error, whether
the action was intended to or could reasonably have been intended to induce reliance." 0 7 However, the court announced sev99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 845.
103. 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (per curiam). For a discussion of this case, see supra
notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
104. Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 843 (citation omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.

eral qualifications for its estoppel test:1 08
1. The complaining party's action must have been induced by
the government's misconduct. If the petitioner would have acted in the same manner without governmental misconduct, estoppel may be precluded;
2. Complainant must have exhausted or must lack opportunities
to correct the error;
3. Where estopping the government would amount to frustrating
the intent of Congress by validating a misinterpretation of the
law, or would intrude on the executive's promotion of policy,
estoppel may not lie except where the combination of governmental misconduct and petitioner reliance deny a benefit
otherwise available;
4. Other equitable principles, such as the alien's unclean hands,
may preclude the assertion of estoppel against the
government.
Applying these criteria to Akbarin's situation, the court concluded that if the facts alleged were proven, the government
might be estopped from asserting failure to comply with section
214.2(f) (6).109 As a result of the telephone conversation with the
INS officials, the hotel personnel director could reasonably have
believed that Akbarin did not have to file any form in order to
work. Having started work, Akbarin could not cure the problem
by filing 1-538 because his employment already rendered him deportable. Estoppel in this case would not interfere with the operation of the immigration laws or "hinder achievement of
important federal immigration goals."" 0 The laws in fact do not
prohibit nonimmigrant students from working, There were also
no equitable defenses raised by the INS.11
In light of these considerations, Akbarin was entitled to a new
hearing in order to present evidence to support the estoppel
claim. 1 2
THE MIRANDA CASE

Miranda v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 3 involved
the denial of petitioner's adjustment of status application following the unexplained failure of INS to act on an immediate relative
visa petition for an eighteen-month period. The visa petition had
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 843-44.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 845.
Id.

112. Id.

113. 673 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
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been filed by Miranda's wife on his behalf, but by the end of the
eighteen months, the marriage had broken up and the wife had
withdrawn the petition.11 4 The Ninth Circuit found "affirmative
misconduct" and estopped the INS from considering the visa petition withdrawn.ll 5
The procedural appellate history of Miranda is of interest. The
Ninth Circuit's original decision116 in the matter was decided in a
rather summary fashion. There the court had simply concluded
that the "unexplained failure of the INS to act on the visa petition
for an eighteen-month period prior to the petitioner's withdrawal
following the break up of Miranda's marriage was affirmative misconduct by the INS."117 The government petitioned for review,
however, and the Supreme Court vacated the original judgment
and remanded for further consideration in light of the Hansen decision."i8 Most practitioners viewed this action by the Supreme
Court as a bad omen for the application of estoppel in immigration matters."l 9 On remand, however, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Hansen in a fashion similar to that of the First Circuit
in Akbarin, and found that Hansen did not compel an outcome
20
different from its first decision.1
First, the court felt that the applicability of Hansen was limited
to situations where charges to the public treasury were at
stake.121 By contrast the petitioner in Miranda was "not seeking
benefit payments out of the public fisc."' 22 Next the court noted
that in Hansen there had been no finding of "affirmative misconduct" by the government representative. Without confronting the
more complex issue of what test to use, the Ninth Circuit simply
said that its original and present opinion "rested precisely on
such a finding" of affirmative misconduct because of the unexplained eighteen-month delay. 2 3 Finally, the court recalled that
114. Id. at 1106.
115. Id.

116. Miranda v. INS, 638 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 101 U.S.
1468 (1981), reaffirmed 673 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982).
117. Id. at 84. In support of this conclusion the court cited two prior decisions,
Sun I1 Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976); Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th
Cir. 1980) (en banc).
118. INS v. Miranda, 101 U.S. 1468 (1981).
119. See Bacon, supra note 9; Hing, supra note 48.
120. Miranda v. INS, 673 F.2d 1105, 1106 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.

in Hansen, the claimant had not been caused to act or fail to act
in a manner that could not be corrected. 124 The court felt that Miranda, on the other hand, had suffered irreparable damage be12 5
cause of the INS misconduct.
Given these distinctions between Hansen and its facts, 26the Miranda court stood firm and adhered to its prior decision.1
ANALYSIs
The Akbarin and Miranda decisions indicate that the concept
of government estoppel is a viable tool against the INS and has
survived Hansen. Both the First and Ninth Circuits independently limited the Hansen case to situations threatening the public fisc. If this distinction stands, the effect of the Hansen decision
in the immigration context appears rather slight given the fact
that immigration cases in general have no direct burden on public
27
funds.1
Both courts also distinguished Hansen on a second ground. In
Hansen, it was important to the Supreme Court that the Social
Security representative's conduct did not create a situation that
the claimant "could not correct at any time.' '128 However, the
Akbarin and Miranda courts both felt the plight of their respective petitioners could not have been corrected once the official
misconduct took place.129 The instant Akbarin began working
without authorization he became technically deportable under
section 214(a) (9) of the Act.130 In Miranda, however, the Ninth
Circuit's summary conclusion that the unjustified eighteen-month
delay inflicted "irrevocable damage on the petitioner"131 deserved
further explanation. A skeptic could argue that Miranda could
have "corrected" or at least avoided the effect of the government's
misconduct by making periodic inquiries on the status of the immediate relative petition. With study, the court would have found
that such a requirement would be an unreasonable burden on
aliens. As a practical matter the INS discourages these types of
inquiries because they consume staff time. Furthermore, most
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., id.
128. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981) (per curiam).
129. Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d 839, 844 (lst Cir. 1982); Miranda v. INS, 673 F.2d at
1106. The Eighth Circuit recently denied an estoppel claim where the alien could
have helped herself. Aiyadurai v. INS, 683 F.2d 1195, 1200-01 (8th Cir. 1982) (by exhausting administrative remedies, the alien could have averted her problem).
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (9) (1976); Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 844 see also supra
notes 97, 103 & 120-21 and accompanying text.
131. 673 F.2d at 1106.
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aliens would be discouraged from making such inquiries once a
petition has been filed because of the lengthy lines and bureaucratic maze usually found at local INS offices. Additionally, it is
of course the duty of INS under its own standards to act in a reasonable time.132 As was stated in Sun Ii Yoo v. INS,133
Immigration agents may have no duty to inform aliens of matters which
the alien themselves have primary responsibility for knowing and could

discover through the application of due diligence, but once an alien has
gathered and supplied all relevant information and has fulfilled all rehim within a reaquirements, INS officials are under a duty to accord to
134
sonable time the status to which he is entitled by law.

The Ninth Circuit's analysis would have been more convincing
had the court reiterated these points.
The bases for distinguishing Hansen used by the First and
Ninth Circuits are, however, quite sound. Hansen was a social security benefits case, and the Supreme Court's decision contained
no broad sweeping indictments of the government estoppel theory. And while the Supreme Court did not find "affirmative misconduct" or provide guidance on the issue of when estoppel
against the government should be granted, there was no criticism
13 5
of lower court opinions where estoppel had been granted.
Therefore, both the Akbarin and Miranda decisions are well
within the parameters of any Supreme Court restrictions on gov36
ernment estoppel.1
The Miranda case has solidified the concept that unreasonable
INS delays will give rise to a finding of "affirnative misconduct"
on the part of the government.37 The decision also comports with
the precedent-setting en bane decision of the Ninth Circuit in
Santiago v. INS.138 In Santiago the Ninth Circuit had initiated
its "affirmative misconduct" methodology of comparing particular
case facts with the Hibi facts for blameworthiness.1 3 9 Soon thereafter the Ninth Circuit concluded that unreasonable INS delays
which have injured the alien are so "oppressive" and, compared
132. See Galvez v. Howerton, 503 F. Supp. 35, 39 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
133. 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976).
134. Id. at 1328-29.
135. See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. at 788 n.4.
136. It is obvious that the First and Ninth Circuits have chosen a more liberal
interpretation of estoppel in light of Hansen than has the BIA. See Matter of M/V
"Solemn Judge," I.D. No. 2894 (1982); cf. Dong Sik Kwon v. INS, 646 F.2d 909 (5th
Cir. 1981).
137. See Miranda v. INS, 673 F.2d at 1106.
138. 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).

139. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.

with the Santiago or Hibi circumstances, they constitute "amrmative misconduct."140 Miranda is therefore properly viewed as
continuing the Sun I Yoo and Villena trend.
The Akbarin decision represents a significant advance in the
development of estoppel law in the immigration area. While the
decisions following Hibi have by and large been decided on a
case-by-case comparative basis, the First Circuit in Akbarin has
attempted to lay down specific criteria to be raised in immigration
estoppel cases. 141 The guidelines set forth by the court'42 make a
good deal of sense and should be welcomed by practitioners and
other courts in search of direction.
The court's "principal inquiries" into whether the government's
action was error and whether the action was intended to or could
reasonably have been intended to induce reliance are easy
enough to understand and apply.143 However, the "secondary factors" which were mentioned by the court'4 4 will ultimately need
further clarification. Specifically, the court noted that frustrating
congressional intent and intrusion "on the executive's ability to
promote important federal policies" were considerations that
"may also affect the decision."145 The court then pointed out that
those problems were not present where the government misconduct and subsequent reliance thereon operated to deny a benefit
that "might otherwise be available." 4 6 This point could very well
be construed to mean that where an alien has been misled by INS
misconduct into thinking that a benefit is available when in fact it
is not, and severe detrimental reliance ensues, the "constitutional
and policy considerations" might militate against a grant of estoppel.147 However, the First Circuit's choice of language that such
factors "may also affect the decision" 46 would indicate that such
"constitutional and policy considerations" are to be weighed but
are not necessarily controlling.
Other equitable doctrines may militate against an application of
estoppel.149 By citing "unclean hands" as an example, future
140. See Sun 1 Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d at 1328-29; see also Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc).

141. Commentators have suggested criteria that differ from those set forth in
Akbarin. See generally Bacon, supra note 9, at 19; Note, supra note 17.
142. See Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 843-44; see also supra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
145. Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 844.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id.
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cases will have to decide whether to incorporate the gamut of the
laws of equity.150 Significantly, the First Circuit cited CorneilRodriguez v. INS151 for its consideration of equities. 5 2 This is
significant because of the fair amount of attention given by the
Corneil-Rodriguezdecision to "basic notions of fairness" and the
prevention of "manifest injustice."'153 In that vein, therefore, the
Akbarin case could be considered a refinement of the cases
which have relied on "fundamental fairness" to correct
54
inequities.1
Akbarin could also be viewed as consistent with cases that
have used the government's violation of its own regulations to
bolster estoppel claims.155 It was important to the Akbarin court
that the INS error in its case "was a misinterpretation of a bind5 6
ing federal regulation, not of a nonbinding one as in Hansen.'
While this point was important to the First Circuit for purposes of
distinguishing Hansen, this alleged regulatory misinterpretation,
if proven, would also satisfy the court's first principal estoppel in157
quiry, that is, whether the government's action was error.
Akbarin and Miranda have therefore reaffred the availability
of estoppel in the immigration context. In so doing, the decisions
have continued a commitment to previous immigration estoppel
concepts and have begun to clarify the standards for "affirmative
misconduct."
STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
For the practitioner representing a client in immigration or deportation proceedings, the case law from Hibi to Miranda and
Akbarin suggests several considerations to keep in mind when
preparing an estoppel claim.
Compare Facts with Other Cases
Because the Supreme Court has never provided a test or set of
150. See generally M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL (6th ed.
1913); J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUTrY JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941).
151. Corneil-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976).
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 844.
Cornell-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d at 302, 307.
See supra notes 32-51 and accompanying text.
Id.
Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 843.
Id. at 843-44.

criteria to delineate "affirmative misconduct" a court is free to
compare the facts before it with the facts in other estoppel cases
to determine if the misconduct of the government under consideration is as "blameworthy" or "oppressive."158 Therefore, the practitioner should describe to the fullest extent the seriousness of
the government misconduct in this case and emphasize the disparity with previous estoppel claims.
ConsiderAny Possible UnreasonableDelay
Given the reaffirmance in Miranda that unjustified delays by
INS can constitute "affirmative misconduct," the practitioner
must consider any possible delay that might be labelled unreasonable. There now appears to be almost a presumption of "affirmative misconduct" where there has been excessive INS delay
injuring or prejudicing the alien. 5 9 Once "an alien has supplied
the INS with all of the relevant information, the INS has a duty to
accord him [or her] within a reasonable time the status to which
60
he [or she] is entitled."1
ConsiderPossible Violation of Regulations
The violation of any applicable regulations must be raised.
Akbarin reemphasizes the fact that a violation or misinterpretation of a binding regulation can lead to or bolster a finding of "affirmative misconduct."161 In fact the violation of a binding
regulation by the government would allow the alien to satisfy the
first part of the Akbarin test, that is, whether the government's
action was error, without much difficulty.162 Therefore the pleth-

ora of regulations which are applicable to the practice of immigra158. This flexible comparative analysis approach serves the practitioner well.
Although the outcome differed in each case, both Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488, 493
(9th Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976), and Sun I1Yoo v. INS,
534 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1976), demonstrate this analysis.
159. See Mendoza-Hernandez v. INS, 664 F.2d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 1981); Shon Ning
Lee v. INS, 576 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1978); Sun It Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d at 1329
(9th Cir. 1976).
160. Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Sun I Yoo v.
INS, 534 F.2d at 1328. Under IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, UNTrED
STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRE-

TATIONS § 245.2a (1981), the INS has set its own standards that can be used as a
yardstick for reasonableness. Galvez v. Howerton, 503 F. Supp, 35, 39 (C.D. Cal.
1980). Many INS districts have adopted "instant," "up front," or "one step" adjudication procedures that may also affect future claims of delay. Memorandum Re:
One Step Processing by E.B. Duarte, Jr., Director of the Outreach Program, Cen-

tral Office, INS (May 21, 1981).
161. See Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 843; see also Corneil-Rodriguez v. INS, 532
F.2d at 306.07; supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
162. See Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 843.
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tion law163 must be familiar to the practitioner.
ConsiderPossible Violation of OperationsInstructions
Violation by the INS of one of its own Operations Instructions' 6 4 with resulting prejudice to the alien, should also be used
to bolster an estoppel claim.165 In Hansen, of course, the claimant's estoppel argument was not aided much by the misinterpretation of an internal department manual that had "no legally
binding effect."166 But because Hansen can be distinguished from
immigration cases on the "public fisc" issue,16 7 the fact that an internal INS Operations Instruction has been breached should be
placed on the scales. Additionally, while Operations Instructions
do not generally carry the same weight as regulations, certain Operations Instructions which are intended to confer benefits usually are given more substantive effect.168 Correspondingly their
violation should be considered as serious as the breach of
regulations.
Emphasize All Sympathetic Factorsand Equities
By emphasizing the "equitable" nature of estoppel and whether
reliance has been reasonable, the Akbarin court has left the door
open for evidence of equities and other sympathetic facts.169 The
teachings of Corneil-Rodriguezalso emphasize a desire to prevent
manifest injustice where fundamental fairness has been violated.170 And the comparative type of analysis in Sun I Yoo and
Santiago certainly invites a look into the sympathetic nature of a
case. 17 1 Therefore the practitioner must emphasize all the equities in a case and point out any unfairness to the client. Given
cases such as Moser v. INS172 and Corneil-Rodriguez, a practi163. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1471.10 (1981); 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.1-572.43 (1981).

164.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF Jus-

(1981).
165. See Galvez v. Howerton, 503 F. Supp. at 39.
166. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 787, 790 (1981) (per curiam).
167. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
168. See Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979) (Operations Instruction relating to deferred action); accord David v. INS, 548 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir.
1977); Vergel v. INS, 536 F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1976); see also Galvez v. Howerton, 503 F.
Supp. at 39.
169. See Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 843-44.
TICE, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

170. See Corneil-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d at 306.07.
171. See Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d at 1328; Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d at 493.
172. 341 U.S. 41 (1951).

tioner could, in fact, reasonably request relief solely on grounds
of "fundamental fairness" first and then use those arguments to
aid a follow-up estoppel claim. 73
Balance Away Negative Facts
Most cases are not, of course, perfect. Many negative facts may
exist in a given case. Indeed the Akbarin criteria invite evidence
of whether there has been an opportunity to correct the government's error, whether a benefit would not otherwise have been
available and whether the government might have any equitable
defenses. 7 4 The practitioner should keep in mind, however, that
the estoppel concept is a doctrine of equity. Any negative factors
are usually only factors to be weighed against positive factors. So
the applicable strategical considerations listed above, as well as
those that the practitioner's own creativity may develop, certainly
provide the basis for limiting the effect of negative factors. Here,
of course, is where effective presentation of evidence and advocacy play their most significant roles.
Fashionthe Remedy Appropriately
The estoppel theory is not a panacea and any remedy requested
pursuant to such a claim must be fashioned in a manner that
seems appropriate. A successful claimant will therefore not necessarily be granted permanent residency status. For example, in
Villena the remedy for the successful estoppel claim was that the
government could not assert that the alien had not adequately
pursued a preference classification.175 In Akbarin the ultimate relief would be that Akbarin would not be deportable and would
presumably resume his status as a nonimmigrant student. Of
course in cases such as Miranda and Sun Il Yoo the relief, that is,
the ability to apply for adjustment of status, would lead to permanent residency. An implicit admonition in Akbarin that the practitioner must keep in mind is that any benefit sought must have
otherwise been available.176 If an alien, for example, has been
misled by government misconduct into believing that a benefit
was available, problems could arise if the relief sought is that
benefit which was never actually available. In such a situation
the practitioner should devise a possible remedy which might be
173. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
174. See Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 844. The fact that the court suggests consideration of equitable defenses for the government invites just such an argument
used to introduce evidence ameliorating negative factors on the alien's side.
175. See Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1361 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
176. See Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d at 844.
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palatable to the court. For example, a grant of deferred status or
extended voluntary departure for an alien who has been seriously
misled to his or her detriment might be suggested in some equita77
ble situations.
Raise Estoppel Claims Early
Despite the BIA's discouraging language regarding estoppel in
the immigration context, 7 8 the claim must be made if the opportunity arises. Particularly in the deportation context, if claims for
relief are not made with justification when the opportunity exists,
the relief may be deemed waived. 17 9 While the BIA has not
granted estoppel and has indicated hesitation in doing so, it has
not emphatically rejected estoppel as a viable claim. Of course, if
the BIA rules against such a claim in a deportation or exclusion
case, review can be obtained in the federal courts.180
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of equitable estoppel as applied in the immigration area has survived the Supreme Court's most recent ruling on
government estoppel, Schweiker v. Hansen. The First Circuit in
Akbarin and the Ninth Circuit in Miranda have distinguished the
Hansen case in a manner that virtually makes the Supreme Court
decision inapplicable to immigration cases. In so doing, these
courts have reaffirmed many developing doctrines in the immigration estoppel area and have begun to set forth manageable criteria for determining what is "affirmative misconduct." The
teachings of these cases and those of other decisions provide
practitioners with a basis for developing strategies in the presentation of estoppel claims, and provide new and continued hope for
the application of this doctrine in immigration cases.
177. See, e.g., Yassini v. Crosland, 613 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1980).
178. See Matter of M/V "Solemn Judge," LD. No. 2894 (1982); see also supra
notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980) (violation of
regulations must be raised in timely fashion).
180. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1976) as
amended by Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97116, 95 Stat. 1611, 1620. The Senate has passed a version of an immigration bill
which would eliminate any federal court review of final orders of exclusion except
for habeas corpus. S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982). The House bill was renumbered as H.R. 6514 after being reported out
by the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law.

ADDENDUM

As this article went to print, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's Miranda decision without receiving
briefs on the merits or hearing oral argument.181 In its per curiam
opinion, the Court found that even if the INS was negligent in delaying for eighteen months, there was no affirmative misconduct
given the large number of applications received by the INS and
the need to investigate their validity, especially where possible
sham marriages were involved. Interestingly, the Court used a
comparison-with-other-cases approach in deciding that there was
no affirmative misconduct. For example, the Court compared the
government's conduct in Miranda with that in Hibi, and found
that it was not significantly different. Furthermore, the Court felt
that the Ninth Circuit's public fisc distinction of Hansen was unpersuasive because enforcement of the immigration laws is an important interest of broad public concern. The Court explicitly
reserved the question of whether the government would be estopped even if affirmative misconduct was shown.
While the Supreme Court's decision increases the difficulty of
arguing estoppel in immigration proceedings, the Court's refusal
to expressly strike down the estoppel concept leaves open the
possibility of its application. Even in delay cases, the new Miranda decision is distinguishable because of the reasonable need
to investigate the validity of the marriage. Given the Court's application of the flexible comparison-with-other-cases approach in
the new opinion, it is even more important for practitioners to
consider all the strategical factors mentioned in the article, to balance equities, and to compare facts.

181. INS v. Miranda, 51 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1982) (per curiam).

